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NOT IN MY BACKYARD: STATE V. QUIDAY AND
WARRANTLESS AERIAL POLICE SURVEILLANCE
HAYDEN BROWN*
WHEN IS A SEARCH A “SEARCH”? The United States Su-preme Court established a general answer to this question
in the seminal Fourth Amendment case Katz v. United States.1
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz held that in most
situations, police intrusion becomes a search when it invades a
person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”2 Justice Harlan’s
analysis was later adopted by a majority of the Court in California
v. Ciraolo.3 This formula was open to much interpretation, and
later courts bore the burden of applying it to a myriad of situa-
tions—including the unique air law issue of aerial police surveil-
lance of individuals’ homes and “curtilage,” or the area
immediately surrounding the home.4 Current Supreme Court
precedent holds that warrantless aerial police surveillance of a
person’s fenced backyard and curtilage is generally permissible
so long as the police officers are legally in the airspace and air-
craft are not exceptionally rare in the area.5 This may come as a
surprise to many homeowners around the country, who presum-
ably believe they manifest a clear expectation of privacy in their
backyards by erecting fences—structures intended to exclude
wandering eyes. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i recently consid-
ered the concerns of such homeowners when it correctly ruled
that warrantless aerial police surveillance of backyards and curti-
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2020; B.A., Brigham
Young University, April 2017. Thank you to Professor Jenia Iontcheva Turner for
her suggestions and insight regarding the Fourth Amendment in the modern
age. A special thanks, as well, to my wife Makayla for her support and
encouragement throughout law school.
1 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
3 See 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
4 Id. at 221.
5 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.
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lage is impermissible under the Hawai‘ian state constitution.6
The Hawai‘ian high court interpreted the state constitution us-
ing the same reasonable expectation of privacy test employed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in construing the Federal Constitu-
tion.7 The U.S. Supreme Court should reverse course on this
important and timely air law issue and follow Quiday’s reason-
ing; the Supreme Court’s recent Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence suggests that it may be willing to do so.
In Quiday, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court correctly held that
targeted aerial surveillance of an individual’s home and curti-
lage is a search under the Hawai‘ian constitution and therefore
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.8 Importantly,
the Quiday court employed Justice Harlan’s Katz test—the same
test used by the U.S. Supreme Court to analyze Fourth Amend-
ment search cases.9 The Hawai‘i court utilized its power as the
ultimate interpreter of its state constitution to provide “broader
privacy protection than that given by the federal constitution”
and in doing so substituted a sensible, liberty-oriented applica-
tion of the test for the overly-technical analysis of current U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue.10
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Quiday, the defendant in the Hawai‘ian case, resided in
Waipahu, Hawai‘i, when a Honolulu Police Department (HPD)
officer received a complaint in October 2012 that there were
marijuana plants growing in the backyard of Quiday’s home.11
In response, the officer performed aerial surveillance by heli-
copter and observed plants in the backyard that looked like ma-
rijuana and were not contained in a structure or otherwise
covered.12 The officer subsequently visited the home on foot
and was unable to observe any of these plants from the street, so
he conducted two more aerial surveillance trips, seeing the same
plants each time.13 During the surveillance, the officer’s helicop-
ter hovered above the defendant’s home at about 420 feet.14
6 See State v. Quiday, 405 P.3d 552, 562 (Haw. 2017).
7 Id. at 558.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 556 (quoting State v. Detroy, 72 P.3d 485, 494 (Haw. 2003)).
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Based largely on information gleaned from this warrantless ae-
rial surveillance, the HPD obtained a search warrant, and
Quiday was ultimately arrested after a search uncovered mari-
juana plants and other drug paraphernalia.15
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Quiday moved to suppress the evidence found as a result of
the officer’s warrantless aerial surveillance, but the trial court
denied the motion.16 Quiday then successfully filed an interlocu-
tory appeal, and the case came before the Intermediate Court of
Appeals of Hawai‘i (ICA). The ICA overturned the trial court
and granted the motion because the surveillance constituted a
search under the Hawai‘ian constitution, even if it did not con-
stitute a search under the Federal Constitution.17 The ICA em-
phasized that the officer’s aerial surveillance was “targeted” and
intruded on the curtilage of Quiday’s home.18 Specifically, the
ICA held the trial court erred in its conclusion that Quiday had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the type of
aerial surveillance performed.19
On appeal, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s
ruling.20 The court rejected the ICA’s suggestion that a multi-
factor test was necessary to determine whether aerial surveil-
lance of a person’s home and curtilage was a search, opting in-
stead to simply ask the two questions posed by Justice Harlan in
his Katz concurrence: (1) did the individual exhibit an “actual,
subjective expectation of privacy”; and (2) is that expectation
one that “society would recognize as objectively reasonable”?21
Because Quiday placed his plants out of the view of the ground-
level public, and people generally do not expect to be subject to
“intensive spying by police officers” from above, the court found
both of these questions were answered in the affirmative.22 Fur-
thermore, the court rejected the argument that warrantless ae-
rial surveillance is not a search because any member of the
public could make similar observations when flying over an indi-
15 Id. at 554–55.
16 Id. at 555.
17 Id. at 556–57.
18 Id. at 557.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 562.
21 Id. at 558.
22 Id. at 562.
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vidual’s property.23 The court distinguished targeted reconnais-
sance “with the purpose of detecting criminal activity” from
happenstance or inadvertent observation.24 Aligning itself with
the reasoning of a similarly-decided California case, the Quiday
court held such “purposeful police surveillance” of an individ-
ual’s home violates its state’s citizens’ reasonable expectations of
privacy and is thus unconstitutional, at least at the state level.25
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of warrantless aerial surveillance twice before its decision in
Quiday.26 In one case, the court considered the legality of aerial
surveillance of a marijuana patch located behind a rural
house.27 In the other, it considered whether officers could aeri-
ally surveil a couple’s greenhouse, which was located forty-five
feet away from the couple’s house.28 In both cases, the court
held the warrantless aerial surveillance was permissible;29 how-
ever, the Quiday court quickly distinguished both of those cases,
explaining that neither case concerned surveillance of a home
or curtilage, and the defendants “did not shield the observed
premises from the public eye . . . by any type of fencing or other
barrier.”30 Therefore, the court treated the curtilage-related is-
sue in Quiday as a matter of first impression.31
III. QUIDAY’S PLACE IN WIDER AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
JURISPRUDENCE
While Quiday only interpreted the search and seizure protec-
tion in the Hawai‘ian constitution, the court’s reasoning was a
direct departure from current U.S. Supreme Court analysis of
the Federal Constitution, which generally permits warrantless
aerial police surveillance of homes and curtilage so long as it is
done from publicly navigable airspace and there is no signifi-
cant physical intrusion or disruption of the property.32 This gen-
eral rule applies to warrantless aerial surveillance of commercial
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 561 (quoting People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299, 305 (Cal. 1985)).
26 Id. at 556–57.
27 State v. Stachler, 570 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Haw. 1977).
28 State v. Knight, 621 P.2d 370, 372 (Haw. 1980).
29 See id. at 373; Stachler, 570 P.2d at 1328–29.
30 Quiday, 405 P.3d at 559–60.
31 Id. at 560.
32 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986).
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properties as well.33 The Quiday court’s holding echoed Justice
Powell’s dissent in California v. Ciraolo, which argued that al-
lowing warrantless aerial surveillance of people’s homes and
curtilage misconstrues Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation
of privacy test.34 While the Quiday court did not explicitly cite
Justice Powell’s dissent in its reasoning, it clearly shared his
opinion that the Ciraolo majority (and by extension, the Riley
and Dow Chemical majorities) misapplied Justice Harlan’s Katz
test when it used public capability to aerially surveil as a justifica-
tion for allowing law enforcement officers to do so without a
warrant.35
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates that the
Court is willing to adapt existing Fourth Amendment rules in
response to changing times.36 In United States v. Jones,37 three Jus-
tices joined Justice Alito’s concurrence, which emphasized that
the nature of modern technological investigative techniques
could violate the Fourth Amendment in some situations.38 Jus-
tice Sotomayor did not join Justice Alito’s concurrence and in-
stead wrote separately.39 She did, however, agree with Justice
Alito’s concerns about technology and long-term monitoring,
demonstrating that a majority of the Court deemed these con-
cerns to be significant.40 In Riley v. California,41 the Supreme
Court removed cell phones from the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the warrant requirement largely because phones
constitute “technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades
ago[.]”42 Most recently, the Court held that warrantless police
review of a phone’s cell-site location data invades a phone
owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy, in part because the
33 See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
34 See Quiday, 405 P.3d at 562; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting).
35 See Quiday, 405 P.3d at 562.
36 Of note, even as early as the Katz case, the Supreme Court held that the
trespass doctrine was “no longer [ ] controlling” in the face of technological de-
velopments. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). This opened the
door for the Court to consider how new technology may impact the expectation
of privacy and how law enforcement may use technology to do their jobs, espe-
cially when using it to surveil individuals.
37 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
38 Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
40 Id.
41 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
42 Id. at 385.
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location data “provides an intimate window into a person’s
life.”43
IV. ANALYSIS
Viewed on its own and in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Hawai‘i court’s holding
in Quiday offers both a compelling counterpoint to the Supreme
Court’s decades-old precedent on warrantless aerial police sur-
veillance and a potential blueprint for change. The Hawai‘i Su-
preme Court correctly decided Quiday for three main reasons:
(1) people manifest a subjective and reasonable expectation of
privacy in activities they conduct in their fenced backyards; (2)
the home and curtilage are generally provided greater privacy
protection than other areas; and (3) requiring a warrant to con-
duct aerial surveillance of homes and curtilage is the best way
forward in an age of rapid technological advancement.
The Quiday court correctly decided the case because it opted
for a straightforward, commonsense reading of Katz and Justice
Harlan’s influential two-prong test to determine whether a
search occurred. The test asks: (1) did the individual manifest a
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) was that expectation
objectively reasonable?44 The threshold question of whether
Quiday manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the cur-
tilage of his home is easily answered because the curtilage enjoys
special protection from government intrusion and is generally
regarded as part of the home.45 This general rule is acknowl-
edged not only in Quiday but also in all three major U.S. Su-
preme Court cases that address warrantless aerial surveillance.46
This protection reflects reality, especially when a homeowner
erects a fence. There is arguably no purpose for a fence around
a residential backyard besides preventing neighbors or passersby
from peering into the yard—an area that the Court in Dow
Chemical acknowledged may often be the site of “intimate activity
. . . and the privacies of life.”47 The U.S. Supreme Court has
43 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
44 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
45 See State v. Quiday, 405 P.3d 552, 558 (Haw. 2017).
46 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 696–97 (1989); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
235 (1986).
47 Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 236.
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recently emphasized that intimate, private activity is a quintes-
sential candidate for Fourth Amendment protection.48
Where Quiday properly departs from U.S. Supreme Court
analysis is in its answer to Justice Harlan’s second inquiry:
whether the person’s expectation of privacy is objectively rea-
sonable. The Hawai‘i Supreme Court correctly answered “yes” to
this question because it focused not on an overly technical analy-
sis of what the public could theoretically do but instead on the
reasonable expectation of the person searched—a focus that
Justice Harlan’s Katz test requires. After all, as the Katz Court
pointed out, the intent behind proscribing unreasonable
searches is to “protect[ ] people, not places[.]”49 The Hawai‘i
high court put this axiom into practice by acknowledging that
when a person encloses his backyard with a fence, he does not
do so with the expectation that the government can nevertheless
aerially surveil his yard to uncover potentially criminal activity.50
In holding otherwise, the U.S. Supreme Court placed great em-
phasis on the notion that any passenger on a commercial flight
could peer down and observe the goings-on in a person’s backy-
ard.51 This reasoning defies reality; commercial flights gain alti-
tude very quickly, and a passenger’s window-gazing during
takeoff or landing is simply not equivalent to a police officer
hovering above a home at 420 feet or conducting a flyover at
1,000 feet. Quiday’s rejection of this argument is wise and re-
flects a commonsense and realistic application of Justice
Harlan’s Katz test.
Furthermore, even if public capability to observe a person’s
backyard weighs in favor of allowing warrantless aerial surveil-
lance, Quiday was still correctly decided because the home and
curtilage are rightfully provided special privacy protection. The
Hawai‘i Supreme Court correctly framed the question before it
not as whether any person may legally look in another’s backy-
ard, but rather as whether law enforcement officers may con-
duct targeted surveillance of a person’s backyard in order to
obtain investigative information.52 The U.S. Supreme Court ig-
nores the difference between these two questions in its warrant-
less aerial surveillance cases but highlights law enforcement
48 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
49 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
50 See Quiday, 405 P.3d at 562.
51 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.
52 See Quiday, 405 P.3d at 562.
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intent in other Fourth Amendment cases. For example, in Jones,
Justice Scalia began his opinion by stating: “It is important to be
clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physi-
cally occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining informa-
tion.”53 Justice Alito’s concurrence in that case reasons that,
under Katz, warrantless “long-term monitoring” of a suspect may
violate the Fourth Amendment even when law enforcement uses
means permissible in the short term, highlighting that the na-
ture and intent of law enforcement behavior is an important fac-
tor to consider.54
The Quiday court recognized that, even if there is no physical
intrusion or actual trespass onto an individual’s property, war-
rantless aerial surveillance of a protected area, like the curtilage,
for the purpose of obtaining information is unreasonable.55 In
the very case that birthed the reasonable expectation of privacy
test employed by Quiday, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
“the reach of [the Fourth Amendment] cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclo-
sure.”56 Thus, the publicly-navigable airspace argument ad-
vanced by the U.S. Supreme Court in allowing warrantless aerial
surveillance of curtilage—a protected area—is unpersuasive; the
only real question is whether homeowners have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy from such surveillance. As discussed above
and as Quiday correctly holds, they clearly do.
While the Hawai‘i Supreme Court did not consider in Quiday
any surveillance technology other than the police helicopter
used in that case, its holding represents the best way forward in
an age of rapid technological change. The introduction of
drone surveillance as a possible law enforcement technique
challenges the basis of U.S. Supreme Court precedent allowing
warrantless aerial surveillance.57 Ciraolo and Riley rest on two ma-
jor assumptions about aerial police surveillance, namely that:
(1) it consists of “simple visual observations” by a human being;
and (2) it necessarily must be performed from a high altitude
and thus does not technically intrude into a person’s home or
53 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
55 Quiday, 405 P.3d at 562.
56 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
57 See Dr. Saby Ghoshray, Domestic Surveillance via Drones: Looking Through the
Lens of the Fourth Amendment, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 579, 593–94 (2013).
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curtilage.58 Drone capabilities undermine both of these assump-
tions. Many drones feature innovative cameras and zoom lenses,
the type of “highly sophisticated surveillance equipment” that
Justice Burger suggested may give rise to a warrant requirement
in Dow Chemical.59
Quiday’s bright line rule, though established in response to
surveillance by helicopter, prevents law enforcement from using
drones and other aerial surveillance technology to invade the
curtilage of homes. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that modern technology presents a unique threat
to privacy and took steps to mitigate its impact.60 In Carpenter,
the Court instituted a warrant requirement for police to access
cellular location data, in part, because such data could reveal, to
a greater extent than human observation, a person’s “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”61 If
this can be said about geographical data extracted from a per-
son’s cell phone, surely it can be said about aerial surveillance of
a person’s backyard, an area in which those associations often
actually take place.
V. CONCLUSION
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Quiday is a
simple, commonsense application of Justice Harlan’s “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy” test and rightly protects individuals’
homes and curtilage from warrantless aerial police surveillance.
Quiday correctly places considerable weight on people’s privacy
interests rather than engaging in a law enforcement-friendly
analysis that strains the meaning of previous Fourth Amend-
ment case law. The correct focus of the Fourth Amendment is
on protecting people, and people clearly expect that activities in
their fenced backyards will be free from targeted surveillance.
Hawai‘i’s high court recognized this expectation and, in doing
so, ensured that their state constitution did what it was designed
to do: protect the rights of Hawai‘i’s citizens. Given the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s recent willingness to alter existing Fourth
Amendment doctrines, Quiday may serve as persuasive authority
58 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 214–15 (1986).
59 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
60 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. Califor-
nia, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
61 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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if the question of warrantless aerial surveillance comes before
the Court again. If it does, the Supreme Court would be wise to
adopt Quiday’s reasoning, as it represents not only a correct
reading of Justice Harlan’s long-standing Katz test but also a log-
ical response to new surveillance technologies and their effect
on air law.
